Abstract. Machines are displaying a trend of increasing autonomy. This has a far reaching impact on the architectures of the embedded systems within the machine. The impact needs to be clearly understood and the main obstacles to autonomy need to be identied. The obstacles, especially from an industrial perspective, are not just technological but also relate to system aspects like certication, development processes and product safety. In this paper, we identify and discuss some of the main obstacles to autonomy from the viewpoint of technical specialists working on advanced industrial product development. The identied obstacles cover topics like world modeling, user interaction, complexity and system safety.
Introduction
Many machines which incorporate embedded systems display a trend of increasing autonomy. Autonomy, in practice, can be considered as the machine's ability to operate without constant human supervision/intervention. In this paper, the main emphasis is to identify and discuss key challenges for architectures of autonomous machines.
Although autonomy has been traditionally associated with robotics and "dirty, dull and dangerous" work loads, it is now moving to all kinds of domains, driven by environmental, eciency and safety considerations [1] . To exemplify the trend of increasing autonomy, consider the evolution of the personal automobile. The automatic transmission was one of the early subsystems that no longer needed constant human supervision. Therefore, it may be considered autonomous by our denition. Another feature that became popular with the advent of electronic controllers within the automobile is cruise control. Cruise control removed the need for constant human supervision to maintain the speed of the automobile. The cruise control feature evolved to Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) which not only regulates speed, but also maintains a safe distance to the vehicle ahead.
ACC systems are currently evolving toward Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) which are expected to eventually deliver total propulsion autonomy, when combined with other subsystems like lane-control, traction control, pedestrian safety, active collision avoidance, etc.
One way to generate autonomous behavior in a system is to make the system intelligent. Intelligence, as dened in [2] , is "..the ability of a system to act appropriately in an uncertain environment. Appropriate action is that which increases the probability of success. Success is the achievement of behavioral subgoals that support the system's ultimate goal". The system's ultimate goal and the criteria of success may be dened external to the intelligent system. For example, the ultimate goal of an intelligent, autonomous car may be to transport the user from point A to point B within a city, with the criteria of success being zero accidents and strict adherence to local trac laws. The goal and the success criteria are dened by the user of the car, not by the car itself.
It should be noted that, strictly speaking, autonomy does not imply intelligence. Intelligence may imply autonomy, but may also imply partial autonomy along with humans in the loop, for selected decisions and actions. What intelligent autonomy does imply, however, is the presence of decisional processes within the machine. The notions of deliberation, planning and decision-making are inextricably a part of intelligent machine autonomy.
The achievement of intelligent machine autonomy requires substantial technical results from primarily two areas: Algorithms and Architecture. Algorithms encode the formal, mathematical knowledge for solving specic problems in a series of computation steps. For example, a sensor fusion algorithm may be used to estimate the current acceleration in an automobile. The Architecture, on the other hand, provides all the necessary principles and infrastructure for executing the algorithms, modularizing the system and communicating data to/from the executing algorithms. A third requirement, from the perspective of industrial adoption, is the availability of cost eective sensors.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on architectures for intelligent autonomous systems. In particular, we present some key challenges for these architectures, from the perspective of industrial product development. This perspective is concerned with the development of products that may be mass produced and sold to end users. Therefore, it has to emphasize topics like safety, certication, development methodology, standards compliance, reliability and cost eectiveness. The challenges presented in this paper were partly elicited from a workshop [3] conducted at KTH The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. The workshop covered topics like bottlenecks to autonomy, safety/certication and verication of autonomous products. It was attended by about 65 participants, most of whom were senior system architects from a broad cross-section of Swedish industry, including automotive, aviation, telecom and industrial automation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief description of the term 'system architecture' and its various aspects, in order to provide an unambiguous context for the entire paper. Section 3 presents some of the bottlenecks to achieving system autonomy, from an architectural perspective. It includes, among other things, a discussion of user interaction, system complexity, safety and safety standards. Finally, Section 4 has a brief discussion on the way forward towards autonomy.
Overview of System Architecture
The term 'architecture' is described by ISO42010:2011 as "fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment, embodied in its elements, relationships and principles of its design and evolution.". In practice, one way to think of system architecture is to decompose it into its conceptual and technical design aspects [4, 5] , as shown in Figure 1 . The content of Figure 1 as well as the description of the content that follows, should by no means be construed as comprehensive. However, it provides an overview with sucient detail to begin reasoning about system intelligence and autonomy.
Service Taxonomy describes the hierarchy of services/features as seen by the user of the system. It describes the externally visible (sub-)behaviors of the system without any reference to how they are internally realized. Logical architecture shows the logical decomposition of the system into its components [6] and sub-components as well as the data-ows between them. It is commonly referred to as the 'system block diagram' and it realizes the behavior/features dened by the service taxonomy. However, no mention is made of how the system components are actually implemented in terms of software and hardware.
Software architecture describes all the software code (components, services, layers, middleware, ...) within the system. Relevant blocks of the logical architecture are mapped onto individual pieces of software code which realizes the functionality of the blocks. Hardware architecture describes the individual computer processing units and the communication channels between them. The software architecture is deployed on the hardware architecture.
Early system architectures consisted of the independent development of features in self-contained hardware platforms connected to a common communication bus. Such architectures are known as federated architectures [7] . In recent times, the trend is to permit a single hardware computer unit to execute multiple software tasks each of which may realize dierent system features and may have dierent criticality. This is achieved by means of robust mechanisms that partition and allocate resources like processor cycles, memory, i/o, communication channels etc. in space and time among the individual software tasks. For example, one processor may execute a set of 5 tasks, where each task executes for a xed period of time and then gets replaced by the next task in the set. Such architectures which provide shared and partitioned access to resources are termed integrated architectures [8] . Integrated architectures oer substantial benets in terms of cost, resource utilization and weight saving. On the other hand, they also necessitate careful management of resources and make it more dicult to analyze and assure overall system behavior.
A system architecture is additionally characterized by the so called 'extrafunctional' properties like system safety, reliability, maintainability, evolvability, etc. These extra-functional properties are applicable across the entire system design and are inuenced by decisions made throughout the conceptual and technical architecture. Furthermore, modern industrial product architectures are rarely 'clean-sheet' designs and therefore a signicant concern in systems architecting is the integration of legacy designs into the architecture. An example of architecture legacy is that in many automobiles, the cruise control subsystem is still a part of the engine management system for historic reasons.
Industrial exploitation of architecture depends on the simultaneous availability of principles, technologies and tools. Academic research on system architectures usually emphasizes the principles, whereas practicing engineers need reliable tools to implement the principles and technologies.
Given the above understanding of system architecture, a relevant question is: Where to start with system autonomy? The subsequent sections present some of the identied challenges to system autonomy, from the architectural perspective.
Autonomy bottlenecks
The bottlenecks identied in this section are not exclusive to autonomous systems alone, but they are especially pertinent to safety critical autonomous systems.
Constructing and maintaining the world model
Intelligent autonomous systems need a model of their internal and external environments to correctly reason about action choices and make decisions. At all times, the model needs to reect the real environment, typically via strong statistical correlations. For example, the correctness of decisions and actions made by a self-driving car depends heavily on the accuracy of the road objects (lane markers, trac lights etc.), other vehicles and pedestrians populating its world model at every time instant. The world model of any moderately complex system is usually maintained by fusing redundant or partially overlapping sensor data. The self-driving car for instance, may rely on a combination of vision, radar, lidar and/or laser sensor data. Each sensor operates optimally under specic conditions and it is a challenge to ensure that the set of sensors as a whole can lead to a high-condence world model under all conceivable operating conditions. Furthermore, sensors can fail and the systems needs to know the degradation of the world model to continue making correct decisions.
Although the fusing of sensor data to construct accurate and reliable world models is largely a matter for algorithms, there are several architecture issues surrounding the topic. Subsystems may require partial world models containing only the information necessary for the subsystem operation. The same information may be needed by several subsystems, but in diering representations. Simultaneously, it may be desirable to have a global, common world model to prevent unnecessary, replicated model building activities within individual subsystems and to have a single source of data. But the subsystems may require the model information with diering Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. For example, an active safety system needs to know information about detected oncoming vehicles with greater accuracy and frequency than a Human Machine Interface (HMI). Some subsystems may require historical information. Should the subsystem maintain that itself or should it be part of a common global world model? (The answer to that depends, among other things, on the number of current and future subsystems that need historical information.) Should the partial word models within individual subsystem be gathered together to form a common global model? Or should relevant parts of the global world model be "projected" into individual subsystems? Should a global world model be implemented in a distributed, redundant way? What about security and access control to the model information? Who are the readers, who are the writers, how to manage simultaneous conicting writes... these are all questions relevant to the system architecture.
From the perspective of autonomous systems, it therefore becomes relevant to explore the design patterns, technologies and tools to build such world models.
User interaction
An autonomous system must necessarily reduce the user engagement required for system operation. If the required user engagement is maintained or higher, autonomy provides no immediate benet. At the same time, the system needs to conduct its operations with maximum transparency, so that the user is aware of what is going on. Unfortunately, it is not always clear what 'transparency' implies, nor do established norms exist to achieve it. An example of this can be taken from the aviation domain (which is particularly rich in such examples), with regards to the dierences in throttle lever movement between modern Boeing and Airbus aircraft. The throttle levers in Boeing aircraft move during autopilot operation, providing a ready visual indication of autopilot activity. Airbus aircraft (the A320+ series) however have throttle levers which can be set to one of several 'gated' positions and do not move, regardless of autopilot activity. After two decades of debate, there is no clear consensus on which design is 'clearly better'.
Extensive discussions on introducing autonomy, whether the introduced autonomy should be high or low, and the exact role of autonomy are especially common in the aviation domain, within the larger discourse on automation [9] . Several perspectives on how to approach automation continue to coexist. These perspectives range from the long-held belief that automation should be matched to functions unsuitable for human control [10] to the more recent view that automated systems may be analyzed as team members [9] . Each perspective highlights dierent user interaction problems which are very much relevant to the discussion of autonomy, such as mode confusion [11, 12] , moving interaction to times of high workload, failure after reaching or nearing the point of no return, automation bias, etc. While the discussions so far have provided balanced views on automation(autonomy), clear consensus on user interaction remains elusive.
Automation and autonomy, though intended to enhance human capabilities, often degrade them. For example, a recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report [13] concludes that for pilots, in addition to degradation of basic 'stick-and-rudder' ying skills, autoight systems could lead to degradation of the pilot's ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state. Worse still, lack of consensus on user interaction leads to functionally similar, yet subtly dierent autonomous systems. This makes it problematic to rely on past experience when human operators migrate between similar systems. Relying on faulty automation might easily be framed as over-reliance and misuse, while relying on correct automation that still allows for mistakes might be framed as under-reliance or disuse [9] . Focusing primarily on the human-in-the-loop as the problem is too frequently a "convenient solution".
From the perspective of autonomous systems, it therefore becomes relevant to explore exible architectures that allow for dierent user interaction paradigms while maintaining maximum transparency and a meaningful exposure of error handling strategies such as graceful degradation.
Complexity and Feature Interaction
The critical concerns of world modeling and user interaction highlighted above, pinpoint another problem area. Federated and integrated architectures are meant to decentralize the logical architecture and allow for treating dierent functionality in isolation. However, autonomy seems to be pushing in the other direction, requiring an increased communication between dierent subsystems. The result is an increased architectural complexity, where the architecture is required to simultaneously isolate and bring together dierent parts of the system. This, coupled with the increasing number of (often conicting) goals within an autonomous system, signicantly raises the cognitive complexity [14] of the system. Increasing complexity has a direct and negative impact on test case coverage, verication and validation of the system.
One of the consequences of complexity is feature interaction. A feature interaction is said to occur when the operation of a subsystem/feature interferes with the operation of another subsystem/feature leading to unexpected and undesirable system level behavior [15, 16] . An example of feature interaction in the automotive domain would be the simultaneous activation of the brakes and throttle. For cyber-physical systems in particular, the external physical environment often 'completes the loop' [17] . For the brake and throttle example just mentioned, the two subsystems may be completely independent in their operation, but the physical laws of the external world dictate that their operation aects one and the same variable viz. the vehicle's speed.
The feature interaction problem needs to be jointly considered by both algorithms and architecture. From an architectural perspective, it can be addressed by two complementary approaches [18] . The rst approach is 'correctness by construction' which refers to the principles and mechanisms of composing systems out of subsystems in a way that there are no unexpected side eects or emergent behavior. The complementing approach is to formally represent both the architecture and a feature interaction and use model checking and verication methods to search for the feature interaction in the architecture. Once found, the interaction can be eliminated by a variety of problem specic approaches. Both the approaches above seek to detect and eliminate feature interactions during the design phase. However, all feature interactions may not be detected or eliminated and therefore intelligent autonomous systems need mechanisms to resolve feature interactions during system operation (a.k.a 'runtime'). Several ways have been proposed to detect and resolve feature interactions at runtime, mostly within networking and telecom domains(example: [19, 20] ), however their applicability to industrial embedded systems has been limited by the required guarantees for robustness and safety.
'Extra-functional' properties
Extra-functional properties are those characteristics of the system which are not directly related to the functionality oered by the system to its user. They are often related to the quality attributes of the system. Examples of extra-functional properties are safety, reliability, maintainability, exibility etc. Autonomy has a signicant impact on the machine's architecture and consequently the extrafunctional properties are also aected. As an example, safety (dened as freedom from unacceptable risk[21]), is profoundly impacted by the bottlenecks discussed so far in this paper. This subsection presents a quick overview of selected extrafunctional properties that aect autonomous architectures.
Redundancy Safety engineers frequently rely on the availability of a human operator to take control, in case the system is unable to cope with its operational environment. The user interaction problems associated with autonomy, along with the fact that a human may simply not be available to take control, means that autonomous systems need to be designed to a greater degree of robustness. Such robustness is often added by means of providing redundancy for critical sensors, actuators as well as communication and computation facilities.
Adding redundancy to existing systems brings up sensitive issues related to cost. Also, existing machinery often simply lacks the physical space to accommodate redundant units (geometry constraints). Therefore, application of traditional redundancy measures is often not feasible for evolving autonomous architectures. New thinking is needed to add redundancy to the architecture while avoiding mere replication of the subsystems under question. Research related to dynamically recongurable embedded systems may yield promising results for this area. This would make it possible, for example, to migrate at runtime, software executing on a failing hardware unit to another hardware unit which was hitherto in 'hot standby' mode. Architectures like IMA-2G within the avionics domain already have limited recongurability as one of the development goals [22] .
Architectures can also be setup to exploit the inherent redundancy manifested by many machines. For example, the engine in modern heavy vehicles is already used for braking; in a multi-engine aircraft, dierential thrust can be used for directional control.
Determinism/Predictability Safety critical systems are usually required to demonstrate deterministic operation. For autonomous systems, it is a matter of debate and semantics whether autonomy involves a tradeo with determinism. It is clear, however, that the issue of complexity discussed in subsection 3.3 will make it more dicult to establish determinism.
Furthermore, while the overall behavior of an autonomous system may remain predictable within certain boundaries, the system may not be absolutely deterministic within those bounds. For example, it may be assured that the collision avoidance function of an automotive active safety system will make a best eort to avoid a head-on collision with an oncoming vehicle. However, the exact trajectory which the vehicle will undertake depends on many factors and cannot be deterministically calculated in advance.
If the behavior of an individual machine can not be deterministically predicted, it is unlikely that the interactions of that machine with a heterogeneous mix of other autonomous, manual and remotely operated machines will be deterministic. Such interaction scenarios are already being envisioned in, for example, upcoming Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) where (semi-)autonomous vehicles will coexist with those having human drivers.
This leaves designers and architects with an open question: What is the extent of permissible unpredictability within the system? This question is not explicitly answered by standards and certication requirements.
Safety Standards for autonomous systems Safety-related concerns are likely to result in requirements for new ways to develop and assure the safety of intelligent, autonomous systems. This might require updates to safety standards, such as:
. This standard is applicable to most safety-related control systems. It species dierent sets of requirements on the design and development of end products based on the required Risk Reduction Level (RRL), i.e. based on the perceived criticality of the end product. These levels are called safety integrity levels (SIL) with SIL 1 providing the lowest risk reduction and SIL 4 the highest. None of these standards are immediately applicable to autonomous systems. The main reason for this is that they rely on techniques for hazard and risk analysis in which human involvement is an important factor in the RRL estimation. ISO2626 for instance directly uses the anticipated capability of a driver to control unexpected vehicle behavior caused by major system failure as a major input to calculating the required RRL (ASIL) on the system. This reasoning is not applicable for autonomous and intelligent functions. It is not reasonable to assume that the driver has his total attention xed on the current trac situation if he is traveling in an autonomous car. On the other hand, increased intelligence could be made to partially replicate the actions provided by an expert human operator. However, this would require changes to the safety standards in terms of new concepts of controllability where the machine intelligence replaces the human being.
Another reason is the complexity of the environment in which many autonomous functions will operate or are expected to operate in within the immediate future. An important example of such an environment is the Intelligent Transportation System, which is expected to be deployed in the EU during the upcoming decade. With the standards above calling for a worst-case analysis centered on each separate vehicle many of the envisioned benets in regard to trac eciency might be lost, for instance by enforcing safety margins with unnecessarily low speed or large distance restrictions between vehicles. Such kinds of safety margins can also lead to conditions where the transport system as a whole is prone to unacceptable high risks, mainly due to the fact that a violation of such safety margins is often not really risky in many practical situations. If the drivers of individual vehicles can bypass the functions implementing such safety margins to the benets of the practical situations, they are likely to start doing so.
A third reason is that architectures for safety critical systems strongly emphasize static specication. Usually, system components and their inter-connections, communication channels and the data exchanged over those channels are all specied prior to system execution and cannot be changed at runtime. Autonomous systems on the other hand can benet from dynamic, self-adapting and selfevolving architectures that respond to the operational situation and environmental inputs. Components can be started and shut down as the system functions, the inter-component connections can be modied at runtime, data-ows can be rerouted and executing code could be migrated from one component to another. Such dynamism is not permitted by existing safety standards and certication processes, mostly because of the impact on determinism/predictability.
Discussion
In order to satisfactorily address the autonomy challenge, it is necessary to investigate the implications of autonomy on dierent aspects of the system architecture. Where do crucial shortcomings exist? What are the immediate bottlenecks? From an industrial perspective, which solutions will yield the greatest usable results? Within a specied industrial domain (e.g. Automotive) is there an identied prioritization of issues obstructing autonomous behavior? These were some of the questions posed during our workshop on Autonomy. This paper has provided an initial overview of the pertinent challenges for industrial autonomous machines.
Autonomy requirements drive the adoption of new design principles and technologies, and often necessitate restructuring of the hierarchies and organization of existing systems. In this scenario, a signicant challenge is that of legacy integration. Most of the systems that are evolving towards autonomous operation already have existing subsystems that fulll their specic roles. These subsystems in turn may exhibit diering levels of autonomy (need for human supervision). When architecting for overall system autonomy, it may not be possible to shue around the contents of these subsystems in the overall logical architecture, or to modify their software/hardware implementations.
As architectures evolve towards autonomy, their information management aspect will gain greater importance. Traditionally, architectures have focused on partitioning and minimizing the data ow across partitions. Autonomy may well be viewed as a multitude of tasks cooperating closely by exchanging data. This data needs to be ltered, abstracted and approximated as it ows around within the system. Communication of high resolution information is architecturally expensive and so it may need to be meaningfully degraded as it ows away from core components, as a tradeo with better Quality of Service. It would fall on the architecture to realize any such data-centric designs and to manage the information entropy within the system.
In section 3 we identied the following topics as currently representing bottlenecks: world model, user interaction, complexity, feature interaction, redundancy and safety. Several of these topics point towards the need for suitable reference models, patterns and architectures, that could provide guidelines that address many of these challenges. A denition of various functionalities and their interfaces related to intelligent autonomous systems, would facilitate the creation of components, systems integration, prototypes, experiments, and may indeed, in the end, pave way for a new market for various AI-related functionalities.
Solutions in the form of domain specic reference architectures would be one way to guide the standardization and development of autonomous systems.
Safety aspects of autonomous systems
Current engineering techniques enable safety critical systems to be developed and deployed, albeit at a very high cost. Moreover, the acceptance for accidents caused by intelligent autonomous machines will most likely be much much lower compared to accidents directly attributable to humans. There are thus strong needs to consider system designs that can be formally veried and proved safe. This drives the verication aspect of architectures. At the same time, as architectures explode in complexity, post hoc verication becomes increasingly dicult. Therefore, methods for 'correctness by construction' will play a more signicant role. This includes, among others, model based system development.
In regard to the weaknesses of the current safety standards, one way forward is to call for new hazard and risk analysis methods and the inclusion of detailed guidelines on how to systematically motivate restrictions in the degree of freedom of the autonomous system functionality with respect to dierent situations. The possibility of this happening is unclear, however, since these standards mainly capture and rank best practices in the industry. Manufacturing safe, intelligent autonomous systems will require these techniques to be introduced in a stepwise fashion, not through a slow process of being accepted by more and more industrial players. A more feasible way forward might be to push for acceptance via the large automotive consortia.
The need for multidisciplinary and cross-domain eorts
At the Stockholm workshop, the following shared challenges and gaps became apparent.
The workshop was attended by several industrial companies representing developers of cars, trucks, heavy machinery, aircraft and military systems. It was interesting to note that telecommunication companies were also present. They expressed interest in architectures for autonomous systems -where they perceived that challenges in developing such architectures were shared with other domains. The take away was that the architecting challenges have much in common. Networking across domains as a way of learning was perceived highly benecial by the participants. Development of intelligent autonomous systems will clearly require the use of results from several academic disciplines. The academic disciplines are unfortunately largely fragmented, and disciplines such as AI, control, software, sensing and signal processing rarely integrate across their specic theories, frameworks, tools and prototypes. Successful and more optimal design of intelligent autonomous systems will require a closer collaboration and interactions between the disciplines. This insight is not new, and is for example one of the key tenets of the Cyber-Physical Systems initiative in the U.S.A [25] . Developing demonstrators and industrial collaboration provide important means for integration as illustrated by the DARPA grand challenge and the GCDC [26] contest. Such collaboration can also help to reduce the often perceived gap between industry and academia.
